601 Consol. Prop. Interests, LLC v. Payne No. 12-15-00105-CV, 2016 WL 786939 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 29, 2016, no pet.)
Monday, June 19th, 2017
The following is not a legal opinion. You should consult your attorney if the case may be of significance to you.
Consol. Prop. Interests, LLC v. Payne No. 12-15-00105-CV, 2016 WL 786939 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 29, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Three-part mineral deed) held that under an old three-part form mineral deed the existing lease clause and the future lease clause did not change the plain meaning of the granting clause. In 1905, Grantor married Wife #1. In 1907, Grantor acquired the land in question. In 1909, Wife #1 died intestate, and her 1/2 passed by intestacy to Grantor’s children. In 1915, Grantor married Wife #2. In 1916, Grantor conveyed the land to Wife #2. In 1931, while the land was under lease to Sun Company, Grantor and Wife #2 conveyed an interest in the land to Grantor’s children. The 1931 deed conveyed “an undivided 1/2 interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under . . . [the land].” The existing lease clause identified the Sun Company oil and gas lease and recited that the deed “covers and includes one-half of all the oil royalty, and gas rental or royalty, due [under the existing lease].” The termination or future lease clause recited that “in the event that the above-described lease becomes cancelled or forfeited, then and in that event an undivided one-half of the lease interest and all future rentals on said land for oil, gas and all other mineral privileges shall be owned by said grantees, they owning one-half of oil, gas and other minerals in and under said lands together with one-half interest in all future rents.” Wife #2’s children contended that no interest was conveyed under the 1931 deed. They asserted that the purpose of the 1931 deed was simply to confirm the 1/2 interest that passed earlier to Grantor’s children when Wife #1 died intestate. All agreed that the 1931 deed was unambiguous.
The court concluded that the plain meaning of the granting clause was that it conveyed a 1/2 interest in the land. The existing lease clause and the future lease clause recited exactly what would happen by operation of law, if the clauses were not included. Neither lessened the force and effect of the conveyance. Grantor’s children owned all of the land.
The significance of the case is the holding that under an old three-part form deed, an unambiguous grant controls over the subsequent existing lease and future lease clauses which simply restate what already happens upon termination by operation of law.