688 Cash v. King, No. 04-16-00700-CV, 2017 WL 3701781 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 23, 2017, no pet.)
Tuesday, August 7th, 2018
The following is not a legal opinion. You should consult your attorney if the case may be of significance to you.
Cash v. King, No. 04-16-00700-CV, 2017 WL 3701781 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 23, 2017, no pet.)(mem. op.) held that attorney’s fees are recoverable under the Declaratory Judgment Act in a suit over title to a leased mineral estate. Decedent died intestate with her three children as her only heirs at law. On the date of death, Decedent owned real property in Karnes County. One child qualified as Administrator and elected to pursue certain claims owing to the Estate. The other two children (“Children”) elected not to finance that litigation, and they each executed assignments to the Administrator conveying whatever they were entitled to receive from the Estate “other than that already received.” The Children’s interest in the mineral estate was subject to outstanding mineral leases. The Administrator executed a mineral deed as “Independent Executor” conveying the entire mineral estate in the real property to the Administrator, individually. The Children filed suit against the Administrator seeking a declaratory judgment that the assignments they executed did not convey their interests in the mineral estate to the Administrator. Administrator sought a declaration that the mineral deed was valid, because the Children’s assignments transferred their interests in the mineral estate.
The first issue was whether the assignments included the Children’s interests in the mineral estate or whether the assignments excepted that interest with the words “other than already received.” The second issue was whether the court properly awarded attorney’s fees to the Children.
The court agreed with the Children’s construction of the assignments. “[W]henever a person dies intestate, all of his estate shall vest immediately in his heirs at law.” The court states that “vest” means to “give into the possession or discretion of some person or authority.” Further, the phrase “already received” means to “take possession of” prior to a specified time. When the Decedent died intestate, the Children’s interests in all of the estate assets immediately vested. Using the plain meaning of the language used in the assignment, the court reasoned that interests “already received” would include the mineral estate before the Children executed the assignments to the Administrator. Therefore, the Children did not assign their interests in the mineral estate to the Administrator because it was “already received” under the terms of the assignment at the time of Decedent’s death. The Administrator’s conveyance of the mineral estate to himself was void.
Attorney’s fees are generally not available in trespass-to-try-title actions, which is generally the only method for establishing ownership or title to real property. However, “a claimant is not required to bring a trespass-to-try-title action when the action is for relief that pertains to a nonpossessory interest.” Because there were “outstanding mineral leases covering the disputed mineral estate,” the Children only had a nonpossessory interest in the mineral estate. Therefore, they were not required to bring a trespass-to-try-title action, and the court properly awarded attorney’s fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
The significance of the case is the holding that trespass-to-try-title actions are not necessary when the action is for relief that pertains to a nonpossessory interest.